

**THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE  
STUDIES**

**THE 2010 JOHN TAIT MEMORIAL LECTURE**

**BY**

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**THE FUTURE HISTORY OF CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY:  
ARE WE FEELING THE HEAT YET?**

“Public service is a special calling. It is not for everyone. Those who devote themselves to it find meaning and satisfaction that are not to be found elsewhere. The rewards of this special calling, like those of other professions, come at a price. The price is submitting to very high standards of professional conduct, accepting public scrutiny and accountability; learning to hold a public trust and to put interests ahead of self; respecting the authority of law and democratic will; and entering into a community that values these as the foundations of good government. The values of public service are both its price and its reward.”

*“A Strong Foundation: The Report of the Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics”*, chaired by John Tait and Co-Chaired by Ralph Heintzman.

Members of CASIS, Colleagues and Friends, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Je suis fort honoré d'avoir été invité par l'ACERS à présenter la 11<sup>e</sup> Conférence commémorative John Tait. Lorsque l'ACERS a été mise sur pied, John a été l'un de ses partisans les plus dévoués. Il serait sans doute très fier de voir ce qu'elle est devenue.

I would like to thank David Charters and CASIS for inviting me to give this, the 11<sup>th</sup> John Tait Memorial Lecture. CASIS has been in operation for 25 years this year and it continues to play a unique and truly valuable role in building bridges among the government, academic and media communities interested in security and intelligence, both at home and abroad. It is so valuable as a national institution that, as the saying goes, "if it didn't exist we would have to invent it". I know from experience how much hard work it takes to organize an international conference like this, and I am sure I speak for all of us in extending warm thanks to the Board of Directors, the organizers and the sponsors of this meeting.

John Tait was a good friend and colleague of mine and it is to CASIS' credit that John continues to be remembered in its annual conference. It is a very good opportunity for us to reflect for a moment on the ideal of public service, and to remember how fortunate Canada has been, throughout its history, to have some of the finest Canadians, like John, who dedicate their lives to serving their country as public servants.

Turning to my theme today, "Understanding National Security", I have some good news and some bad news. As you know, national security and intelligence matters seem to be in the news every day. There is a lot going on. So the bad news is that my lecture is over 9000 words in length and 20 pages single spaced – a two hour lecture! But the good news is that I have scaled down my talk drastically and will keep to 30 minutes or less. If any of you really want to read the whole version, I hope it will be published shortly. A summary version will be available on the CASIS website after the conference.

Because I will be summarizing many of my points, it is important that I give you a bit of a roadmap for following what I want to talk about.

Think of a classical symphony: it typically has four movements. This lecture will have four "movements" – this introduction plus three main sections. There will be a melody line or a basic thread that runs through all three sections. In case it is not obvious, I will identify it at the very end if time permits.

I plan to tackle the theme of Understanding National Security from three angles or perspectives: the past, the future and the present. I will address a question in relation to each of those perspectives. First, from perspective of the wisdom of the past, what would John Tait have wanted to tell you today? Second, looking to the future, I want to pose the question: what factors would a commission of inquiry identify after a possible future national security disaster as causes or contributors of that disaster? And, coming back to the present, the third question is what practical initiatives or reforms can I recommend be

taken by the federal government to help make sure that there is no need for some future commission of inquiry.

Those are big questions and you can understand why my paper ended up so long.

To begin with then, if he were here today, what would a wise head of the past like John Tait have wanted to say about our current national security challenges? There are many things I could mention because John would have had strong views about the current situation in Canada and the world. But if he could address only one issue, I think he would have zeroed in on the public service's duty to "tell truth to power".

John underlined this duty in the context of leading a Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics. Its 1996 report was called *A Strong Foundation* or, simply, the "Tait Report"<sup>1</sup>. This splendid document should be read and re-read for years by professional public servants at all levels of government, as well as by Parliamentarians and citizens interested in understanding Canada's Whitehall system of government and the values for which government officials see or should see themselves accountable.<sup>2</sup>

I recognize that the concept "truth to power" can appear a bit sanctimonious. Of course, it does not imply that any one public servant is necessarily the bearer of "the absolute Truth", capital "T". But it means that professional public servants consider themselves obligated to honestly and objectively tell the people they report to what they really think, with no hidden agendas and no spin.

All this may sound kind of irrelevant to some of you. Canada's security and intelligence cultures, in my experience, tend to be operational and uncomfortable with "philosophy". So it is important for me to underline that John Tait would have wanted to discuss the truth to power issue for three very practical reasons.

First, he would want to remind us that there is no part of the public service of Canada for whom the obligation of speaking truth to power is more crucial than in the security and intelligence services. Truth to power is the core purpose of security and intelligence services, their *raison d'être*. Intelligence and security is or should be a "no spin zone".

Second, John would no doubt observe that the professional ethical value of telling truth to power in the federal public service seems to be at a crisis point in 2010. The recent spate of resignations and firings of public service "truth speakers" is bound to have had a severely intimidating and chilling effect on people called on to provide guidance and advice to ministers. This is deplorable but it is not the first time that the challenge of meeting this high standard has come up for public servants. In fact, to a greater or lesser

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<sup>1</sup> John C. Tait, *A Strong Foundation: Report of the Task Force on Public Service Values and Ethics*, (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Management Development, Discussion Paper 1996 and reprinted in 2000), ISBN 0-662-64491-3.

<sup>2</sup> The Tait Report discussed four categories of values which it suggested together constituted the public service's core values: the four are democratic values, professional values, ethical values, and people values. I want to highlight today the family of "professional values" outlined in the report, one of the most important of which is the public servant's duty to "speak truth to power"<sup>2</sup>.

degree, it came up under every one of the six prime ministers I worked under. It is part of the perennial tension of serving democratically elected governments. Professional public servants know that pulling their punches in giving advice not only hurts the government of the day, it can imperil lives and even the country. So it is a challenge that has to be met continuously, if not without extreme difficulty on some occasions, in a public service career.

The third reason I think John Tait would want to dwell on the truth to power theme today is because, as we saw in Washington and London in the lead-up to the Iraq Invasion, temptations in intelligence and security services to toe a political “party line” at the expense of truth to power can be immense. In the US and British cases, it is clear that many intelligence and security professionals, to their shame, failed the test. I wonder if they, and for that matter their Canadian counterparts, have fully internalized all the important lessons of that “intelligence failure”?

One reason Canada may not have felt it necessary to explore that question, at least not in public, is because, in fact, Canada did not follow the analytical pattern of its allies on that occasion. Rather, our analytical services, or at least parts of them, seem to have done right in 2002-02 what most allied intelligence analysts did wrong. Understanding why this difference of experience occurred is a matter of considerable importance because it could tell us a lot about best management and policy practices in national security matters generally and intelligence analysis in particular.

From what I have been able to discern from open sources, it is quite a remarkable story. You will recall that Canada came under intense pressure by the President of the United States and senior members of his administration as well as the Canadian media to join the so-called “coalition of the willing” in invading Iraq. Canada was under a “full court press” to support the US. The Prime Minister had a do or die meeting with President Bush in Detroit. The National Post front page of September 9, 2002 pictures the situation dramatically.

But Canada was resisting the pressure for two reasons. First there was no UN Resolution authorizing an invasion and, second, our intelligence analysts had determined that there was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction. They judged, correctly as it turned out, that there was no evidence of weapons of mass destruction – not that there *were* none – but that there was *no evidence* of them. On this one nuanced expert judgment turned the policy outcome.

In his memoirs, then PM Jean Chretien recalls that in Detroit George Bush offered to send his intelligence experts to Ottawa to convince him about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Chretien responded, “No, don’t do that, George ...if you have proof, send it to my analysts through the normal channels. They will look at it, and I will decide.”<sup>3</sup> The analysts he was referring to were in the Privy Council Office’s IAS.

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<sup>3</sup> Jean Chretien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2007), p.309.

Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Canadian analytical expertise and resistance to “dodgy dossiers” provided the Prime Minister with a basis for taking an independent view and resisting the pressures from Washington and London. Canada stayed out of the Iraq invasion and this saved many Canadian lives and much treasure. This instance of truth to power may have been one of Canadian intelligence’s finest hours and John Tait would have wanted to take this opportunity to publicize it and salute the individual professional analysts responsible for it.

Turning from this perspective of the past, I would now like to look at Canada’s national security from a future perspective.

An important starting point for talking about the “future” is to note two facts. First, security and intelligence in Canada has truly gone through a revolution in the space of a mere ten years. From being on the periphery of the government agenda, they have moved to the very centre of contemporary local, national and international public policy concern.

Second, despite almost non-stop criticism from special interests and some in the media, it seems fair to recognize that, whatever its shortcomings, Canada’s security and intelligence services must have been doing a lot of things right over the last ten years. We have not had an attack on our country despite being on Bin Laden’s hit list, our security and police services have successfully disrupted or prevented serious potential attacks, and they have arrested and convicted potential attackers despite a not-always well informed or well-disposed judiciary. And, so far, we have avoided being made scapegoats for terrorist attacks on our American neighbours that could lead to cross-border economic hardship in both countries. In short, judged by those high standards, national security and intelligence in Canada since 9/11 has to be seen as a major success story. Rather than the usual accentuation of the negative, I think the Canadian public should be told about the other half of the glass more often.

Having said that, it remains true that security and intelligence is about looking ahead, not backwards, because the likelihood of a negative national security event or disaster remains very high – almost a certainty. Security and intelligence professionals are like lookouts on a ship in a turbulent sea. It is not the icebergs that you got past, but the ones that may be looming in front of you that count.

So let’s turn our thoughts for a few minutes to possible challenges to Canada’s national security. In doing, so I want to change the metaphor from icebergs to frogs.

Everybody has heard of the frog experiment. It is said that if frogs are dropped into a pot of boiling water on the stove, they will immediately leap out to safety. However, if they are put in a pot of cold water and the heat is slowly increased until the water is boiling, the frogs will stay in the water until they boil to death. Perhaps the frog experiment can help us in thinking about the future of our national security.

Is it possible that our relative successes in security and intelligence of recent years may be insulating us from adequately “feeling the heat” of trends and drivers brewing under the surface that could boil up into serious trouble downstream? Can we spot trends and drivers at this point that should be addressed now, not after disaster strikes?

One way to try to spot trends that may be leading to downstream trouble is the forecasting technique of writing “the history of the future” . In this case, this involves imagining a hypothetical future national security disaster scenario and then working back through the factors that may have caused or contributed to it, as best we can see them from at this point in time.

So, I ask you to imagine that there has been a major national security “event” or disaster in Canada, say, in 2012. A commission of inquiry has been asked to report on the factors that contributed to or inhibited our ability to prevent this national security debacle. The report comes out in 2015 – that’s five years away. I would like to speculate on what the ten top factors would be that the Commission’s report would identify. They are presented à la David Lederman, in reverse order of importance from #10 to #1 and, because my time is limited, I will simply enumerate them with only a few supporting explanatory comments and leave a fuller discussion to another occasion.

### **The Top Ten Causes or Contributing Factors of Canada’s Next National Security Disaster**

#### **10. The Decline of Canada’s Major Institutions of Public Information and Debate.**

The reason Canada is considered a model by many countries is the traditional quality of its major public and private institutions. But by 2010 many of these can be seen to be in significant decline. They are fragile. The heat is noticeable but they are not yet at the boil!

Among the most vital of these are what I call the “truth-telling” institutions, the ones that deal with information and knowledge, whether as creators, communicators, or arbitrators of truth, insight, debate, and public understanding. I would include in this failing institution category the Parliament, the courts, the media, the churches, professional public servants, and perhaps above all, Canada’s universities and colleges.

Every one of these institutions has been under pressure in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> C and, in my opinion, the trend line is negative from a national security point of view.

Of all of these fragile institutions of public information and debate, the most significant for Canada’s future national security, in my view, are our academic institutions and the education system as a whole

## **9. National Security “Sacred Cows”**

It will come as no surprise to anyone in this room that Canada has a number of sacred cows or untouchable subjects that, while very important to national security, simply cannot be discussed publicly, let alone debated, without danger to the commentator’s reputation or even personal safety. Examples of where public commentators walk on eggs where there should be full and free debate would include Israel-Palestine and to a degree China.

## **8. The Dis-United States**

A national security disaster for Canada is not limited to something like an attack on Parliament or on the Montreal subway system by extremists. As we saw after 9/11, possibly the most serious national security threat to Canada can be the economic effects of a blockage of our two-way trade with the United States. Younger people in the audience may not remember how Hillary Clinton, Senator for New York, quickly blamed Canada as the source of the 9/11 attackers in New York and Washington and added to the atmosphere of panic that resulted in a blocked Canada-US border.

Our biggest trading partner, neighbour, and long time best friend is going through a period of severe economic and political polarization and this could have outcomes that could negatively affect Canada’s relations with the US and our national security interests.

Whatever the challenges of the relationship, the bottom line is that an American problem is a Canadian problem. If there is a national security disaster in the next few years, we can be sure the Commission of Inquiry’s report will have a lot to say about developments in the United States.

## **7. Inadequate Information Sovereignty**

A few years ago I wrote an article in which I used the phrase “information sovereignty”.<sup>4</sup> It seemed to me that the concept of national sovereignty needed to be enlarged in the midst of an “information revolution” to include explicit recognition that without information sovereignty a country’s true sovereignty was in doubt. This meant having some kind of explicit independent information- and knowledge-generating capacity concerning all the most important domestic and foreign policy issues facing a nation’s governments and citizenry, starting with issues of national security and defence. Today, I believe more than ever that sovereign nations in the 21<sup>st</sup> C more than ever require a strong indigenous information and knowledge generating capacity of their own, including strong, well resourced intelligence services.

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<sup>4</sup> Anthony Campbell, *Canada-United States Intelligence Relations and “Information Sovereignty”* in David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, and Norman Hillmer, *Canada Among Nations 2003, Coping with the American Colossus*, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.159.

This concept of information sovereignty raises three questions: what would it take for Canada to have full information sovereignty? To what degree do we have information sovereignty on the national security issues that count most? And, would true information sovereignty require Canada to have a full scale foreign human intelligence service?<sup>5</sup> There is not enough time to debate these questions today but my point in raising them is to suggest that they should be fully and publicly debated and the consequences addressed.

Yes, there have been increased resources allocated to collection and analysis of information. We have felt the heat after 9/11 and in light of our involvement in Afghanistan. But nonetheless, I do not believe that the independent information/knowledge capacity of the Canadian government on the major national security matters is adequate to our needs. In the report of the Commission of Inquiry of 2015, this will be seen to matter.

## **6. Canada's Negative National Security Culture**

A positive security culture refers to a combination of broad public understanding of our country's national security challenges, societal support in principle for our security services, informed and supportive public institutions including the Academy, and legislators, and courts fully literate on national security matters. A negative security culture refers to weak to non-existent understanding and therefore indifference in the general public to national security until it becomes a crisis, knee-jerk suspicion of security services and their activities, a constant media and court fed preoccupation with human rights as if they were the opposite of national security, and shallow indifference among legislators, courts and policy-makers to national security realities. The latter comes closest in my experience to describing Canada's current national security culture.

We seem to have difficulty accepting that anybody would want to kill large numbers of us cuddly, kindly Canadians. Even the convictions of potential homegrown terrorists seemed incapable of getting Canadians to see that we may be in the midst of a fight for our lives and way of life. Our weak national security culture means that as a society we are vulnerable to under-reacting or overreacting or to being manipulate if a national security crisis should occur.

## **5. The Conflict between the Need for Secrecy and Public Transparency**

One significant offshoot of this negative culture that is very pronounced in Canada is a national preoccupation with "transparency" and "access to information" and an aversion to secrecy. This has vast implications for national security. Members of Parliament, the media, and most academics, ardently push for the maximum of transparency and the minimum of its opposite, secrecy. Although there is some self-interest in their efforts, they have had good reason for their concern because for most of Canada's history there

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<sup>5</sup> Ted Parkinson, offers a very good discussion of the merits of a Canadian foreign intelligence capacity beyond the current ambiguous CSIS capacity in *Has the Time Arrived for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service?* Canadian Military Journal, Summer, 2006.



has been a hyper preoccupation in security matters for secrecy which has sometimes reached seemingly ridiculous proportions.

As in so many aspects of national security work, access to sensitive information needs to be about the exercise of good judgment in finding a rational balance in situations where legitimate interests diverge – the public interest in being informed about national security versus the public interest in not divulging information that could prejudice Canada's foreign relations or security interests.

All that said, at the risk of offending some of my academic and journalistic colleagues, I want to be clear that I strongly support the need for secrecy in government and for strict legislated controls against unauthorized access to state secrets in the national security domain. I believe that the government should have the sole residual prerogative to decide where to draw the line in matters of secrecy affecting national security, not the courts, and certainly not crusading information commissioners. I think the knee-jerk push for transparency in government is wrong-headed in matters of policy advice to government and especially in matters of national security.

My scandalous views do not stop there, I have to admit that I think the Access to Information Program has gone way beyond Parliament's original intended purposes, it is grossly expensive (making the gun registry look cheap and efficient by comparison) and it creates many undesirable unintended consequences and distortions not foreseen when it was enacted. In short I think it should be radically reformed.

Of course, the challenges of transparency versus secrecy go well beyond ATIP. Some have very serious implications for Canada's national security. When alleged security offenders and their lawyers seek to exploit the tension between national security interests and individual rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to force government not to proceed with legitimate national security prosecutions for fear of being required to divulge sources and methods that would prejudice larger national security interests, including our cooperative information sharing relationships with other countries, then we should be feeling the heat.

#### **4. The New National Security Information Battlefield: Spin and Propaganda**

Among the most important drivers of change to emerge in recent years in the national security environment globally and nationally is the advent of information and public opinion as decisive factors, as opposed to peripheral elements, in national security policies, programs and outcomes. Tony Blair dramatically highlighted this point in a New York speech last week in which he said that it would be impossible to defeat extremism "without defeating the narrative that nurtures it"<sup>6</sup>. I think he is absolutely right!

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<sup>6</sup> Jon Swaine. *Radical Islam Outsmarting West: Blair*, (Ottawa: The Citizen, October 2, 2010), A 11.

In an article published last year, I wrote, “we have been living through a global convulsion of seismic proportions known as the Information Revolution. It has catalyzed a change in the place of information in the calculus of power and statecraft. ‘Soft power’, ‘public diplomacy’, information warfare’, ‘total information dominance’, and ‘spin’, among other terms, have become defining concepts of our age... (and) propaganda has moved from the periphery to centre stage as a tool of, as well as a threat to, national governments. This development has inevitable consequences for the media and for state security and intelligence services and for the relationship between them”.<sup>7</sup>

Technological change, cheap accessible global electronic communications, new social media, and their successful and adroit exploitation, especially by Islamist extremists, but far from limited to them, has introduced a new and challenging dimension to national security. This will play a part in any national security disaster that might occur in the foreseeable future.

### **3. The Challenges of Radicalizing Beliefs and Ideologies in Canada**

Since well before 9/11 we should have known that a likely driver of a potential national security disaster could come from a global or national clash of world views. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”<sup>8</sup> thesis has had a major impact on world views around the globe and not only among Muslim extremists. It has explanatory power for many despite being fundamentally wrong.

I am inclined to think that he correctly identified the germ of an important national security insight but he got the details wrong. Whereas he put the clash of civilizations in a geographic context, one monolithic cultural block against another, the world I see evolving has a *clash of 3 mindsets*. The conflicting mindsets are not bound by geographic zones as much as they are ideological tendencies that can be found *within* many countries of the world including Canada. To the degree there is conflict among them, it will take place within countries, not between countries or blocs. And thus we are facing the challenges of “homegrown” radicalization.

The Commission of Inquiry into the next national security disaster will have to grapple with the conflicts that these three worldviews may generate within Canada and abroad.

### **2. Disfunctions in Canadian Law, the Canadian Legal System, and the Constitution**

From my previous comments you will already have deduced that I anticipate that the Commission of Inquiry of 2015 will zero in on Canada’s dysfunctional, rigid, slow and

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<sup>7</sup> Tony Campbell, *Bedmates or Sparring Partners? Canadian Perspectives on the Media-Intelligence Relationship in the ‘New Propaganda Age’*, published in Robert Dover and Michael Goodman (eds), *Spinning Intelligence: Why Intelligence Needs the Media, Why the Media Needs Intelligence*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), p.165-166.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations?* Foreign Policy, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993

expensive legislative and legal systems as prime contributors to the hypothetical national security disaster of 2012.

Although it is a sacred cow, I think the Canadian constitution would have to be the starting point of a clean up of our legal system to deal with multiple levels of jurisdiction and competence on national security matters.

Part of the Constitutional issue is the other legal sacred cow: the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on which Canada's legal fraternity, starting with the law schools, has been fixated for over thirty years. It has completely transformed our laws and governance, in particular by transferring power away from Parliament to the judiciary and in the process opening up much new business for the legal profession, often with the help of public Legal Aid funding. The judiciary for its part has used the Charter to do things that could never have been done by democratically elected legislatures. Meanwhile as Donald Savoie tells us<sup>9</sup>, the legislatures have been increasingly sidelined by the Executives which have been centralizing power in all Canada's jurisdictions.

After the disaster of 2012 the public will call for remedial action to mitigate a dysfunctional legal system from a national security point of view.

### **1. The Organization, Structure and Practices of Canada's National Security System**

One thing is immediately noticeable about the organization, structure and practices of Canada's national security system as they are today as compared with most comparable countries. They all look pretty much the same as they were ten years ago. There have been some additional resources, new efforts at integrated security and law enforcement services, significant improvements in interagency collaboration, and new national security laws. There has even been a first-ever federal national security policy announced in 2004 which, while limited, and now out of date, was an important and positive departure. These are all significant improvements.

Nonetheless, I feel uneasy about the fact that there has been so little public debate about let alone change in our national security system. The pragmatic, incremental, business as usual approach with changes largely at the margin may have been the right national security strategy for Canada up to now but I wonder if it is a sign that we are not adequately feeling the heat.

Related to this is the fact that unlike comparable countries following 9/11 and the Weapons of Mass Destruction fiasco, Canada has not carried out a broad, public inquiry into the implications of a changing national security environment for how we organize and carry out our national security and related intelligence activities. Targeted inquiries such as the Arar Inquiry and the Air India Inquiry were too narrow in scope and oriented to fault-finding to have done the broader policy job, though each deserves credit for trying.

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<sup>9</sup> Donald J. Savoie, *Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999)

If there is a national security disaster ahead of us I think it is likely that the subsequent Commission of Inquiry will point to the lack of public debate in Canada and the lack of innovation in our national security organization and practices. In particular, I think it will likely question our continued reliance on a centrifugal system of national security silos with loose and confused coordination and accountability.

## **Recommendations**

Now I would like to turn to the third and last major section of this lecture in which I want to focus on possible ideas for change in our national security and intelligence approaches. Without pretending that they are comprehensive, I want to propose six concrete ideas from my areas of experience for your consideration.

First, I recommend that the federal government should launch a major trans-Canada public consultation and inquiry into reforming and updating Canada's national security policies and system. This would include discussion of the organization and practices of security and intelligence and related law enforcement fields. It should be a representative, non-legal, public inquiry, designed to engage wide public participation and debate and to make recommendations for reform. Its aim would be educational as well as problem-solving. It would ask the question "where is the heat we should be worried about and how do we cool it down to avoid future national security disasters?"

Second, without waiting for this process to conclude, there are some organizational changes in the current federal system that need consideration. To begin with, I think the roles and responsibilities of the National Security Advisor and the Coordinator for Security and Intelligence need to be divided. Both jobs have a different perspective and they are both big jobs. To the degree they are done by one person, they should not be accompanied by additional responsibilities.

Related to this idea, I think Canada should establish a new National Security Agency. It should be headed by the Coordinator for Security and Intelligence. Its role would be both internal and external security and intelligence coordination and horizontal liaison and integration across all jurisdictional boundaries. It would not be part of the Privy Council Office or of Public Safety but would report to the Prime Minister's National Security Advisor in the Privy Council Office and to the Minister of Public Safety.

Fourth, I recommend the creation of a new analytical agency along the lines of the Office of National Assessments in Australia, but bigger and broader in scope and concept. Canada has too few experts analysts to guarantee national information sovereignty, and it needs better professional development and career planning to ensure our analysts are the best in the world. All the existing specialized analytical groups in various departments and law enforcement services would remain in place with the exception of the analytical group in CSIS and there would be planned interactivity and inter-professional secondments among them with a view to building a true "intelligence community" as

opposed to a confederation of analytical fiefdoms. CSIS analytical resources would be moved as a core unit into the new central analytical office of national assessment.

Fifth, as the other leg of this reorganization, I recommend that CSIS' responsibilities should be both broadened and narrowed in the sense that its mandate should be limited to collection but the ambit of its collection function should be broadened to cover all forms of intelligence, domestic and external including a clearly legislated responsibility for foreign human intelligence – HUMINT – where this is in our national security or other interests. CSIS would operate as the central collection agency reporting to the Coordinator of the National Security Agency and would work in parallel with the new analytical organization.

Finally, a sixth set of practical changes relate to human resources policies in the national security and intelligence organizations. Institutions are not built overnight, and people are the core of their success or failure. To strengthen Canada's information sovereignty, I think the federal government should do four things:

- (1) Substantially increase its investment in analytical and assessment personnel.
- (2) Establish an unclassified "Canadian Security and Intelligence Apprentice Corps" for young Canadians entering the post secondary work force.
- (3) Establish an "Open Source and Alternative Intelligence Office" to work on open source information collection and alternative assessments, with staff not requiring high level security clearances. Its purpose would be to reinforce our classified collection and analytical organizations. It would allow much greater flexibility in hiring and it would entail much lower costs.
- (4) Establish an "Intelligence Reserve" – a program designed to tap into the large number of retirees from government and from the private sector with a wealth of experience relevant to Canada's security and intelligence knowledge needs.

## **Conclusion**

Those six sets of recommendations wrap up this effort to address Canada's national security from the perspectives of the past, the future, and the present. John Tait would not have agreed with everything I have said but he would have enjoyed debating the various ideas. I hope you will too.

Thank you.

Tony Campbell ©